Xavier University

Exhibit
Honors Bachelor of Arts

Undergraduate

2020-5

On a Defense of Democracy: How Roman Delatores and Emperors
Dismantled Libertas and Established the Principate in the Early
Roman Empire
Justin R. Scott

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.exhibit.xavier.edu/hab
Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient Philosophy
Commons, Classical Archaeology and Art History Commons, Classical Literature and Philology
Commons, and the Other Classics Commons

1

Justin Scott
Director: Dr. Thomas E. Strunk
Readers: Drs. Alexandros Laftsidis and Karim Tiro
Instructor: Dr. Shannon Byrne
On a Defense of Democracy:
How Roman Delatores and Emperors Dismantled
Libertas and Established the Principate in the Early
Roman Empire

2
I. Introduction
Lawyers, both modern and ancient, have been instructed to formulate rational and
compelling arguments based on the evidence presented in a particular case. Despite the many
changes, additions, and subtractions by modern conceptions of law, as those applicable in the
American courts, both of which have formed the American Constitution and the American court
system. This formulation of rational and compelling arguments has diachronically been a central
theme in all forms of law practice since Republican Rome. If, however, this central theme of
rational and compelling arguments was subtracted with indefensible slanders and a law system
heavily influenced by one man, namely the Roman Emperor, how could lawyers practice law in
courts?
This legal overturn took place under the Roman Principate and, in particular, during the
prosecution of C. Silanus (consul in 10 C.E.) by a delator, Mamercus Scaurus. Not only did
Silanus have to fend off accusations of extortion by the provincials of Asia, but also Scaurus’
prosecution for violating the “godhead of Augustus” and “spurning the majesty of Tiberius” at
the same time (Tac. Ann. 3.66).1 The accusations, by their very nature, raise the question for
defendants, like Silanus, how does a citizen either violate the “godhead of Augustus” or “spurn
the majesty of Tiberius.” Silanus, we might imagine, was just as confused, being unsure of how
to effectively defend against these accusations on top of the other accusations being levied
against him by his provincials. Such was the atmosphere under the emperor and the delatores
during the first two centuries of the Principate. This atmosphere resulted in a complete change in
the way Roman law had been interpreted and enforced under the Principate compared to how it
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had been under the Republic. The Principate’s law became more private and susceptible to
manipulation by individuals like the delatores and the emperor, both of whom used their power
and influence to cement their interpretations of the law into common practice.
The development of the delatores in the Roman legal system during the first and second
centuries C.E. changed the way in which law was practiced in the Roman Empire. The term
delator 2 refers to a Roman citizen, usually of the senatorial class, who was informally
conscripted by the emperors to inform on Roman politicians and citizens. The delatores
informed the emperors directly about a wide variety of people, such as political dissidents, antiimperialists, or political/personal enemies of the emperor. The delatores were a new type of legal
informers for the Romans, while there were the accusatores under the Republic, the delatores
differed from the accusatores because the delatores’ accusations had tangible effects on the
accused. As will be explained in this thesis, while the accusatores had the ability to, more or
less, alter public perception about individuals, the delatores had the ability to ruin political lives,
force exile, and suggest state confiscation of property to the emperor.
The delatores operated during the early Principate under the Julio-Claudian emperors,
such as Augustus (reign 27 BC-14 CE), Tiberius (14-37 CE), and Caligula (37-41 CE), when the
delatores actively changed the operations of the Roman legal system. Some emperors, like
Marcus Aurelius (161-180 CE), regulated the delatores closely and restricted the amount of
freedom that they possessed in Roman politics and law. For example, Aurelius made it a habit to
ask the Senate for permission over financial decisions, which was not required, but reflected
traditional republican norms of senatorial spending.3 This financial aspect of the law, as will be
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discussed later in this thesis, became one of the gifts that the delatores received for their
accusations. Other emperors, like Tiberius, gave their delatores free rein of both the politics and
the laws of the Roman Empire through confiscation, prosecution, and other uses of the law for
personal benefit. Based upon their relationship with the emperor, the delatores posed a great
threat to the accused, the locus of power in the Principate. Accusations stemming from the
activity of the delatores had real political consequences on the individuals they were targeting,
such effects could include exile, state confiscation of personal property, or political blacklisting.
The introduction and subsequent development of the delatores as the emperor’s political
tools drastically altered how the Roman legal system operated under the Principate compared to
how the system had operated under the Republic. The delatores rejected many traditional Roman
legal practices, like eloquent speaking and training, and superimposed their own form of legal
practices based on venomous prosecution, infamy with the emperor, and the acquisition of
wealth. Many Romans, particularly lawyers that favored traditional republican-style legal
practice, despised this new legal system and resented the delatores and the legal system that they
upheld and employed. Early imperial Roman lawyers, having been forced to adapt to the new
legal system, changed also their practices in order to defend against the delatores’ prosecutions
of both themselves and their clients. This change in the practices of Roman law reflected a larger
political shift in Roman power as the emperors progressively abolished democratic processes in
favor of authoritarian imperial ones. In other words, they ripped political power away from the
Roman Senate and placed it on the imperial throne.
The delatores operated in a system where proximity to the emperor and a close
relationship with him mattered more than one’s own ability to eloquently defend oneself. This
change in the legal system between the Republic and the Principate meant that while the
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emperors desired for their political and personal enemies to be prosecuted that did not dare to try
and flex governmental authority in order to target their enemies. Rather, they enlisted, or rather
simply, encouraged some individuals, the delatores, to prosecute their enemies for them with the
promise of riches, power, status, or some other form of compensation.4 For example, during the
reign of Tiberius (14-37 C.E.), a delator named Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, sat in on a trial in
which Caepio Crispinus, quaestor of Bithynia, accused Granius Marcellus, praetor of Bithynia.
Piso was a delator who viewed court cases and then would inform emperor Tiberius about how
the trial had progressed. Crispinus, similar to Scaurus’ prosecution of Silanus, slandered
Marcellus with undefendable accusations all of which personally attacked Tiberius (Tac. Ann.
1.74). These accusations alleged that Marcellus’ character reflected all those traits that were seen
as foul under the imperial system for the citizens which, I argue, could have included impiety
towards the emperor and the Roman state, treason, and positing a statue of Marcellus himself
above a statue of Augustus. All of which, therefore, could have been perceived as treason.
These accusations against Marcellus’ character were undefendable because, similar to
Silanus’ hearsay of his so-called “disrespect” towards Augustus, they were impossible for
Marcellus to provide evidence against. Delatores, like Piso, often would silently attend trials,
which served as a reminder to judges, lawyers, and the witnesses that the emperor would take
notice of the proceedings. The delatores would also have imperial protection so that they would
make their presence both known and show that they had imperial approval. Tacitus recounted
that Piso “was therefore put in a litter and accompanied home by an officer of one of the
praetorian cohorts; while rumor debated whether the escort was there for the preservation of his
life or the enforcement of his death” (Tac. Ann 3.14).
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Piso’s imperial entourage demonstrated his influence that he had within the courts on
account of his relationship with emperor Tiberius that clearly showed that crossing Piso meant
also offending the emperor. The mere presence of Piso, I argue, was sufficient for the magistrate
to rethink his judicial decisions, keeping in mind that Piso would have informed Tiberius about
the trial. Having a delator present during the case shows that the delatores crippled legal
proceedings and restricted individual liberties, because magistrates harbored more fear for
imperial backlash rather than for the republican laws.
Simple gestures such as observing court cases, defile any legal system, Roman or
otherwise, because of the implicit pressure that judges would experience before and during the
trial. The judges could, therefore, easily pass judgment not based on evidence, but on the
perceived desires of the “observer,” whether that be a delator or the emperor himself, desires out
of fear of punishment by imperial authority. Although a subtle political move, the presence of the
delatores in legal proceedings demonstrated the emperors’ desire to extend their influence over
the Senate and the legal system. The delatores became extensions of the emperors within the
courtroom to continually remind magistrates and lawyers that the emperor would take into
consideration their arguments and judgments. The result of this extension into the law, I will
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argue in this thesis, becomes a source of degradation of libertas. Libertas will be defined in this
5

thesis as political freedom that Romans had experienced under the Republic but had slowly
became degraded by the delatores under the Principate.
I will divide this thesis into three separate categories of arguments: 1) an analysis of the
republican legal system; 2) the rise of the delatores and degradation of libertas; and 3) the
institution of a new imperial legal system based on political violence and fear. Throughout this
thesis, I will argue that the legal and political actions of the delatores in the early empire affected
the Roman legal system so that the emperors gradually fractured individual libertas and replaced
it with a fear of the state in order to cement their authority over the new Empire.
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Both ancient writer and modern scholars have debated the exact meaning of Roman libertas that includes not only
its definition, but also provides the socio-political context, within which Romans understood themselves.
Wirszubski, in Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early Principate (1-30), argued
that the conception of the meaning and significance of libertas was a poly-layered understanding for the Romans
that included: libertas’ relationship to citizenship (civitas), the surrounding Roman population (Populi Romani),
Roman laws (leges), equality (aequa), dignity (dignitas), the way in which power was balanced (i.e. the rule of law),
and individual rights. Thomas E. Strunk, in History After Liberty: Tacitus on Tyrants, Sycophants, and Republicans
(23), provided two prevailing theories on the definition of the word, one from Florentius (Dig. 1.5.4), a second
century CE jurist under the Principate, in which he described: “Liberty is the natural faculty of doing what is
pleasing for each to do, unless it is prohibited by force or by law.” The other from Matthew B. Roller in
Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Emperors in Julio-Claudian Rome (228) arguing that “libertas means the
same thing in all cases: it means ‘the (desirable) condition of not being a slave.’” While I believe that Roller’s
argument is too absolute, the true definition and understanding of Roman libertas is a mixture of these three
aforementioned definitions that includes how Romans related the laws to their understandings of themselves as
individuals, as citizens of Rome, and as “world-citizens,” in which I mean to convey the way that they understood
themselves to be free to pursue what they desire without being subjugated by domini [masters].
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II. The Republican Legal System and Libertas
The old republican legal system encouraged regular men to rise up through the political
ranks by their own merits. John North argues that “whether [one] became a great man in the
Rome of [his] day depended on [his] own efforts and [his] own merits, as judged by [his] fellow
citizens.”6 Non-senatorial men, referred to as novi viri or novi homines, “new men,” had the
ability to rise through the political world until they reached the Roman Senate, the consulship, or
another position of political power based upon the approval of their fellow-citizens and peers.
This path to political power for Romans was called the cursus honorum that Roman
politicians, the most notable of which was Cicero, followed to reach political power. This path
described the important offices that a Roman would hold as a milestone on their path to political
power starting at the quaestorship, then aedileship, praetorship, and finally reaching the
consulship. While the path to this political power had been available to all citizens through the
cursus honorum, Ronald Syme counters that, “[i]n the beginning knowledge of the law had been
the monopoly of the governing class; and for a long time the men of birth and station continue[d]
to be the authoritative exponents of legal science.”7 The elite, educated, and rich upper class, for
the majority of the time when the republican government had operated, hoarded political power
in the republican legal system. The upper class, having been in positions of judicial power for
generations, naturally became the authorities on republican law. As a result, these upper class
men dominated judicial positions, such as magistrates, who interpreted Roman laws and
established the science and art of the republican legal system.
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While the elite certainly maintained legal and political power, there was a way that
individuals could rise through the legal ranks through an election as a magistrate. Roman
magistrates, some of whom could have been non-senatorial individuals, had to be elected
through an election by the Roman people.8 In theory, at the very least, any Roman citizen could
make a name for themselves, however, for reasons such as established influence, money, and
connections, the rich of Rome would have an easier time than a middle or lower class prospect,
who lacked these resources.
Regarding legal matters and lawyers within the court a man’s own merits and efforts did
not in entirety constitute legal or political power. Neither did his own ability to speak eloquently
mattered equally, if not more, to what he was arguing in court. As a result, legal careers held for
some articulate and eloquent individuals a path to political and social infamy. The Romans
placed less emphasis on the evidence that the lawyer would have presented during the trial and,
instead, evaluated lawyers based upon their oratory. In other words, the Romans, when they
judged arguments, focused on how a lawyer presented his argument rather than what he argued.
It was, thus, oratory that held the keys to political success, which could be demonstrated in the
courtroom or during a public speech.9 This emphasis on oratory will be taken into account later
during the examination of the imperial legal system, which will demonstrate how imperial
delatores relied on their relationship with the emperor rather than their individual legal/oratorical
skills. One of the ways that a lawyer could demonstrate his prowess in oratory and courtroom
eloquence was by effectively controlling witnesses through precise examination.
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Under the Lex Cincia, a law of the tribune Marcus Cincius Alimentus passed in 204
B.C.E. forbidding lawyers to be compensated after pleading a case, republican lawyers held
themselves to a high standard in which their work was more for principle than financial
compensation. This law, which, in general, republican lawyers held to, became a central part of a
lawyer’s commitment to his ideals about justice without being affected by financial
compensation. The Lex Cincia will become one of the many issues that imperial lawyers raise
about the delatores on account of the large amount of compensation that the delatores would
receive through the prosecutions, which, more often than not, came from the emperor through
state confiscation of property of the convicted.
Witnesses, in the republican court, fell into two general categories, voluntary and
demanded by law. Roman lawyers adjusted the structure of their examinations and crossexaminations around these two categories. Quintilian (35-100 C.E.), a Roman orator and
rhetorician in the first century C.E., explained that “there are two kinds of witnesses: voluntary,
and those whose presence in the public courts is commonly demanded by law. Both sides use the
former; the latter are available only to the prosecution” (Quint. Inst. Book 5.7). Witnesses that
voluntarily testify in courts, both modern and Roman, in general, are amicable to their side,
while hostile to the other side. Subpoenaed witnesses can be hostile to both sides; lawyers, on
both sides of the trial, have to readjust their questioning so that the witnesses deliver accurate
and useful testimony as evidence. Modern lawyers, like Roman lawyers, attempt to use direct
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symbolic than literal, but Augustus still felt the need to formally renounce the law for the delatores.
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examinations to let the witnesses paint a story for courtroom for the jury/judge and crossexaminations in order to have opposing witnesses agree with another reasonable point of view.11
While it was true that a Roman lawyer needed to be well-trained in oratory, in order to
extract evidence from witnesses, lawyers still needed to extract evidence through their
questioning of witnesses. Using pompous language could distract witnesses, the magistrates, and
even the lawyer himself from either drawing out or understanding the intended point that the
lawyer attempted to show.12
The way in which lawyers structured their examinations and cross-examinations, as either
hostile or friendly, mattered in both republican and imperial trials because lawyers would have
treated witnesses from both their side and their opponents’ in different fashions. Quintilian
argued that “[w]ritten statements are easier to combat: (1) there will surely have been fewer
scruples when there were only a few persons to sign the document; (2) absence from court can be
attacked as showing lack of confidence; (3) if the main personality involved is unassailable, we
can discredit the signatories” (Quint. Inst. 5.7.2). Quintilian argued that lawyers in trials ought to
form their arguments based on written statements to clearly point to and demonstrate the
weaknesses of witnesses to discover the truth of the matter. Ronaldo Ferri explains that in the
fifth book of his Institutio, Quintilian discussed these categories of witnesses and recommended
different approaches to each type of witness.13 Roman lawyers, similar to modern lawyers, were
expected to be able to change their style of examination depending on the individual witness, and
the Roman courts took notice of how effective a lawyer’s style had been on the witness.
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Without written statements, it would be very difficult for lawyers to make arguments
about the truths of the cases, if the witnesses were allowed to provide conjecture about different
events. The delatores did not need to order their accusations around these types of evidence, but
rather chose to throw slanderous accusations, which will become vital to how the delatores
degraded Roman conceptions of libertas within the courtroom.
The republican legal system attempted to uphold Roman conceptions of libertas through
fair trials that had been argued through witness-based evidence. Republican lawyers sought to
find truths about justice and morality through eloquent speeches, for both the prosecution and the
defense, and, most importantly, were not compensated for their efforts. Other than
moralistic/idealistic reasons, Roman lawyers were not concerned with compensation since all
public offices remained unpaid until the Principate.14 However, something within the Roman
legal system changed because the delatores started acquiring large amounts of wealth and power
under the Principate, which was something that the republican lawyers were not accustomed to
because of the Lex Cincia. The cause of this dramatic change occurred for two reasons: the
delatores ignored or malformed republican conceptions about legal practice to acquire power and
the emperors rewarded the delatores with gifts and political positions for their loyalty in order to
maintain their power of Rome.
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III. The Rise of the Delatores and the Degradation of Libertas
The Roman lawyer under the Empire attempted to use the evidence, primarily the
witnesses, to attack the character of the accused and paint him as someone, who would commit a
given type of crime, rather than proving through evidence that the accused actually committed
the crime. This meant that republican norms of eloquent defenses or prosecutions, wellresearched evidence, and proper courtroom etiquette fell out of favor for the delatores under the
new Empire. Steven H. Rutledge, with reference to imperial lawyers, stated that “[w]hether the
orator will prevail or not depends not on the crime itself, but on how the prosecution presents it.
The character of the accused must be represented in such a way that it corresponds to the type of
crime the defendant is accused of having committed.”15 Rutledge echoed both Quintilian and
Ferri in their discussions on the categories of witnesses and approaches lawyers could use for
each witness type16 in that Roman magistrates in the Empire compared to those in the Republic
rendered judgment differently based upon their perception of the accused’s character that the
trial had developed through the arguments of both the prosecution and the defendant. Under the
imperial legal system, however, the delatores emerged, breaking Quintilian’s ideals for lawyers,
and, on account of either their lack of knowledge or disregard for republican legal practice and
oratory, relied on their relationship with the emperor to deliver vicious prosecutions of political
enemies.
Quintilian (35-100 C.E.), despite his commentary on republican-era legal and oratory
practices for imperial lawyers, condemned the delatores’ form of legal practice because he
formed his ideal imperial lawyer from republican standards for law practice. This is not to say,
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however, that Quintilian favored imperial lawyers over their republican counterparts. Rather,
Quintilian desired, through his writings, that imperial lawyers should emulate republican
lawyers, which was something that delatores continually ignored and rejected. Quintilian wrote
under the Principate, however, the parameters that he drew were republican and the delatores did
fit his mold of an ideal Roman lawyer based upon the way that the delatores practiced and
manipulated the law. I argue that an example of the delatores’ diversion from republican
parameters can be found in the tenth book of Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, written under the
Principate, in which he disapproved of the delatores’ extempore arguments. Quintilian admitted
that “[my] point is not that he [Quintilian’s ideal lawyer/orator] should prefer to speak
extempore, but that he should be able to do so” (Quint. 10.7.4). This interpretation of Quintilian
is in accordance with Chris Holcomb’s view: he comments, with respect to the delatores’
immoral political and legal activities, that their extempore arguments violated Quintilian’s ideals
on using such devices.17
Extempore arguments, both Quintilian and Holcomb would agree, have their purpose in a
lawyer’s arsenal, but should not dominate his/her oratorical style. A good lawyer should be
flexible and generate extempore arguments when necessary, but, importantly, a lawyer should
not solely rely on their extempore arguments. Well-researched and rehearsed arguments that take
skill and time to develop are ways that lawyers demonstrate their mastery over the art of law.
Quintilian explained why it is foolhardy for orators to put all their faith in extempore arguments:
[n]o one should trust his native talents so much as to hope that this capacity will come to
him immediately as a beginner. As I advised about mental preparation, so also with
impromptu facility: we must develop it gradually from small beginnings to perfection
which nothing[,] but practice can achieve or maintain (Quint. Inst. 10.7.18).
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Making extempore arguments without training or practice can lead to improper, rushed, or
influent arguments where the lawyer’s argument or reasoning can be lost to the magistrate.
Having a previously research argument that has been structured allows the lawyer to change and
improvise, through extempore arguments, his/her already formulated argument based upon the
other side’s arguments. A good lawyer, moreover, should be skilled in preparation and
improvisation in order to deliver fluent and compelling arguments for the trial.
The new imperial legal system placed importance on a close relationship with the
emperor over being skilled in practicing law or oratory. While it may be true that these two
attributes were not mutually exclusive (indeed, a delator may have been skilled in oratory and
have a close relationship with the emperor), but skill was not required to become successful in
the imperial legal system. Atkinson explains that, when a young pupil of a lawyer started out into
the Roman legal practice, the emperor had the power to make or break his career. The emperor
could bestow on the pupil one of two grants: either the emperor could grant latus clavus18, in
which a purple line would be stitched into a rising politician’s toga, symbolizing his elevation to
senatorial status, or ius respondendi,19 in which the pupil would become a jurist who had the
legal authority to deliver judicial decisions that would become binding law. These decisions
would be upheld in court and ensure that imperial policies would be implemented in the imperial
legal system.20
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A relationship between a young lawyer/delator and an emperor could have developed for
any number of reasons: political gift, familial relationship between the pupil and emperor,
special interest in a pupil by the imperial family, or other similar situations. These relationships,
however, were not formalized ceremonies in any sense of the word, but rather informal
agreements between the individual or family and the emperor in a quid-pro-quo type of
agreement. Suetonius explained that Augustus would appoint young Roman nobles to public
affairs to gain their support for his imperial ideology:
To enable senators’ son to gain an earlier acquittance with public business, [Augustus]
allowed them to assume the broad purple strip immediately after the gown of manhood
and to attend meetings of the senate; and when they began their military career, he gave
them not merely a tribunate in a legion, but the command of cavalry as well…he usually
appointed two senators’ sons to command each division (Suet. Aug.17.38).
These appointments and favors that emperors, like Augustus, would bestow on young men that
had a senatorial future helped emperors maintain their control over the legal system with loyal
senators and magistrates.
For example, Augustus conferred on some jurists this grant of ius respondendi, which
became a common practice for the emperors following Augustus. The emperors used the ius
respondendi and latus clavus as ways to centralize state power around the imperial throne
through loyal magistrates and lawyers that would support the emperor because he had shown
public support for the pupils through these types of imperial grants.21
While it is unclear what authority either ius respondendi or latus clavus specifically
granted the individual jurist, other than being marked as an imperial favorite, Craig Anderson
speculates that this position would have marked particular jurists as favored by the imperial
throne. Rather than making the jurist’s opinion legally binding in Roman law, the jurist’s opinion
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on the case would symbolize imperial opinion on the law and it would be rare, if not politically
detrimental, for a judge to refuse an imperially-supported jurist’s opinion on a law.22
Although imperial favor, in general, meant success for an individual delator, it also
became a source of much hatred and distrust among the public because of the delatores’
tendency to be lax with their morality. In that respect, Tacitus (56-120 C.E.) commented on how
a jurist, Ateius Capito (30 B.C.E.-22 C.E.), on account of his approval from Augustus, had risen
higher and faster through the Roman legal system than his rival, Antistius Labeo:
For that age produced together two of the glories of peace; but, while Labeo’s
uncompromising independence assured him the higher reputation with the public, the
pliancy of Capito was more to the tastes of princes. The one [Labeo], because he halted at
the praetorship, won respect by his ill-treatment; the other [Capito], because he climbed
to the consulate, reaped hatred from a begrudged success (Tac. Ann. 3.75).
Unlike Labeo, who insisted on remaining independent of imperial favor, Capito gained the
greater political position, the consulship, because he relied on imperial power to propel him to
political heights. On account of this, Labeo had been deemed the more honorable in the public
eye for pursuing political power independently. Capito, on the other hand, rose to political power
over Labeo despite the public disapproval for clutching onto his imperial favoritism. I argue that
Labeo would have received more lucrative positions or opportunities courtesy of the emperor
rather than Capito because the emperor would have recognized the potential benefit from a jurist
focused on results rather than ideals of justice.
Discrepancies between lawyers’ and the delatores’ financial compensation became a
fiery debate within some of the senatorial meetings. For the sake of clarity, an imperial lawyer is
an orator/rhetorician that focused on the practice of the law that relied on republican ideals of
arguing cases through eloquent defenses and evidence-based arguments. The delatores, on the
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other hand, differed from the imperial lawyers in that they disregarded these models of
traditional Roman conceptions of good lawyers, as defined by Quintilian and emulated by
Cicero, in favor of clutching their imperial favoritism to dominate courtrooms and reap the
benefits of a delatio23, which could include money, land, or status from the convicted.
Although lawyers would criticize the delatores, some emperors, such as Tiberius, would
interpose themselves through their political vetoes to protect the delatores from being
prosecuted. Tacitus recounts a debate within the Senate about the issue of suicide affecting
financial compensation for the delatores:
And since [an accused praetor Caecilius] Cornutus had fallen by his own hand, a proposal
was discussed that the accuser’s [the delator] reward should be forfeited whenever the
defendant in a charge of treason had resorted to suicide before the completion of the trial.
The resolution was on the point of being adopted, when the Caesar [Tiberius], with
considerable asperity and unusual frankness, took the side of the accusers, complaining
that the laws would be inoperative, the country on the edge of an abyss: they had better
demolish the constitution than remove its custodians (Tac. Ann. 4.30).
Tiberius chose to disregard republican conceptions of financial compensation from the Lex
Cincia in order to protect the delatores’ theft of money, a portion of which, of course, as
emperor, he would have received. For most cases, as was the case in Cornutus’ trial, the state, or
in other words, the emperor, would confiscate the accused’s property after being convicted on
crimes, such as treason, sexual effeminacy, and other difficult to disprove accusations based on
the lack of evidence. After the state/emperor had confiscated the convicted property, the emperor
would gift a portion of the loot to the delatores as compensation for their services in convicting
an “enemy of the state.” Despite the criticism against this theft-gift system orchestrated by the
emperors and their delatores, the emperors and pro-imperial senators/delatores ignored

I define a delato as an “informing” which would entail a trial with a prosecution by a delator. A delatio should be
reserved for only those prosecutions by the delatores since a delatio required some act of informing for the
prosecution to occur.
23
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advocates of new laws surrounding financial compensations during trials. Lawyers, therefore,
found themselves hard-pressed to pass compensation reforms through the Senate because the
emperors were flexing their imperial vetoes to block those types of legislation.
Lawyers criticized the delatores’ disregard for the Lex Cincia by accepting financial
compensation for their prosecutions. Tacitus expanded on the implementations of the Lex Cincia
within the courtroom:
emperor [Claudius], who considered that these arguments [the different arguments given
earlier either defending or criticizing receiving financial compensation for lawyers and
the delatores], if less high-minded, were still not pointless, fixed ten thousand sesterces
as the maximum fee to be accepted; those exceeding it to be liable on the count of
extortion (Tac. Ann. 11.6-7).
At the very least, the emperors seemed to recognize the issue of allowing lawyers and the
delatores to receive money during an ongoing trial because of the obvious concern for bribery.
However, only a few emperors decided to retain this republican ideal for compensation. By the
reign of Trajan, the Lex Cincia had fallen out of usage because lawyers and the delatores would
be compensated after their work had been completed. While it may be true that this modification
by Trajan would have decreased corruption during the trial, the lawyers, and more importantly
the delatores, could have been compensated well after the trial had been concluded. At the very
least, it discouraged bribery within court proceedings. But this practice of post-trial
compensation could have resulted in encouraging faster and more vicious prosecutions by the
delatores, as they were no longer to be paid during trial proceedings. They would be determined
to “exploit” individual cases in order to receive the maximum amount of benefits.
Cassius Dio (135 C.E.-235 C.E.) provided another example of how imperial favoritism
often propelled delatores to higher positions of political power over those individuals, who
sought to retain their independence from the imperial throne. Emperor Tiberius, on account of
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Julius Graecinus’ refusal to accuse Marcus Silanus, a former legal adviser that fell out of
Tiberius’ favor,25 executed Graecinus. Dio explained that “when the senate desired to dishonor
Gaius [Tiberius], [Tiberius] personally prevented the passage of the measure, but on his own
responsibility caused all his predecessor’s images to disappear by night” (Dio Roman History
60.5.). While a complicated situation, this execution and subsequent prosecutions demonstrate
how politically detrimental, and even life-threatening it could be for imperial advisors, lawyers,
or delatores to fall out of favor with the emperor.
This imperial approval led many delatores to abuse the legal system and partake in acts
of corruption, such as state confiscation of property, which undermined the republican legal
system. Tacitus described the disrespect of the delatores for republican laws stating that “[a]ll
the laws our ancestors discovered, all which the deified Augustus enacted, are now buried, those
in oblivion, these—to our yet greater shame—in contempt” (Tac. Ann. 3.54). Since the delatores
worked alongside the current law and also the prosecutions by the delatores had become
increasingly more entwined with either state-enforced or state-created corruption, Shreyaa Bhatt
comments on this passage pointing out that the delatores and emperors implicated laws to
sanction or legalize state-confiscation of personal property.26 The delatores did not break the
current law under the Principate, but rather they manipulated interpretations of the laws to
legalize their thievery, abuse, and violence. The delatores and the emperors bent Roman laws
through political intimidation and fear alongside imperial approval and enough pro-imperial
judges and jurists, in order to make those “interpretations”—if such a word could even describe
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their abuse of the system—align with Roman law, thereby legalizing actions such as stateendorsed confiscation of property. Tacitus described how Lucius Volusius Saturninus (60
B.C.E.-20 C.E.), an appointed magistrate had used this trick to his own advantage, explaining
that “he himself enriched it with the consulate, and, besides discharging the duties of the
censorship in the selection of the equestrian decuries, became the first accumulator of the wealth
which raised the family fortunes to such unmeasured heights” (Tac. Ann. 3.30).
The new legal system allowed for individuals new in politics to quickly gain political
power; however, it also encouraged some individuals, the delatores, to abandon republican
practices of law. For novi viri, who wanted to secure power quickly, as explained earlier with the
imperial jurists, latched onto the emperor and imperial power to establish themselves among the
senatorial class. Romans understood that a politician holding political office under the imperial
regime provided evidence that this politician collaborated or, at the very least, accepted the new
imperial regime.27
The delatores and other pro-imperialist politicians attempted to transform positions of
authority, such as magistrate positions, into imperialist positions of power and influence that
reflected the original republican positions. For example, a delator could have been appointed to a
magistrate that the Republic had viewed as the judges on the law, however, the delator would
rule cases to adhere to imperial ideology and edicts. Since emperors needed loyal magistrates to
implement imperial dictates on Roman law, the delatores became natural choices to fill these
positions for the emperor. Rather than destroying their credibility by circumventing republican
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legal processes, the delatores could use the political office that they received to credibly enter the
political system with their imperialist ideologies and pursue wealth and power.28
Some individuals, whether they be equites, freedmen, or pupils of a lawyer, who
depended on the patronage of the emperor, received coldness and hostility from many members
of the senatorial class furious with the imperial interference in both the political and social
cultures, which normally were dominated by the rich upper-class aristocrats.29 Tacitus provided
the example of Bruttedius Niger, a delator who prosecuted Gaius Silanus, a corrupt governor of
Asia, and advanced at the cost of those above him:
Bruttedius, amply provided with liberal accomplishments, and bound, if he kept straight
road, to attain all distinctions, was goaded by a spirit of haste, which impelled him to
outpace first his equals, then his superiors, and finally his own ambitions: an infirmity
fatal to many, even of the good, who, disdaining the sure and slow, force a premature
success, though destruction may accompany the prize (Tac. Ann. 3.66).
Rutledge, moreover, argues that “the delator becomes a genus, readily identifiable as a
marginalized individual out to destroy his betters.”30
The prosecution by the delatores disrupted Roman life and plunged Rome, from the
delatores’ inception, into a state of violence, tyranny, and suspicion. Tacitus, in his Historiae,
explains the situation within Rome as chaotic:
High birth, wealth, the refusal or acceptance of office—all gave ground for accusations,
and virtues carried the surest ruin. The rewards of the informers were no less hateful than
their crimes; for some, gaining priesthoods and consulships as spoils, others, obtaining
positions as imperial agents and secret influence at court, made havoc and turmoil
everywhere, inspiring hatred and terror (Tac. Hist. 1.2).
Tacitus described a Rome without order, without purpose. Rome itself seemed like it had been
turned into a wild jungle with predators, the delatores, running around the city having free rein in
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pursuit of their prey because of the relative lack of order and restrictions to the delatores, who
gained access to all forms of political positions, like priests, magistrates, or consuls. Rutledge
highlights that this description of Rome with a tripart crescendo including the Vesuvius’
eruption, the burning of the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline, and—placed purposefully at the
end of the crescendo—the delatores’ unchecked reign of Rome. This subtle but clear
prioritization signals the fact that in Tacitus’ mind the delatores had been the most destructive
element, surpassing a volcanic eruption and horrors of wartime conquest.31 Thomas E. Strunk
echoes Rutledge’s opinion, adding that these events had been some of the most harmful effects
that Rome had endured which uprooted friendships, virtues, and even public service.32 Both
Rutledge and Strunk agree that Tacitus purposefully placed the delatores at the end of the
crescendo to further highlight how dangerous, violent, and detrimental they had become to
Rome, its politics, and traditions.
The Romans perceived voluntarily prosecuting other citizens as morally dubious because
the prosecutor needed to provide evidence proving why another Roman should be convicted of a
charge. In particular, under the Principate, prosecution became a sensitive area of legal practice
because of the delatores. Cicero, in his De Officiis, explained why prosecutions had such a
negative stigma for Romans:
But if it shall be required of anyone to conduct more frequent prosecutions, let him do it
as a service to his country; for it is no disgrace to be often employed in the prosecution of
her enemies….For it requires a heartless man, it seems, or rather one who is well-neigh
inhuman, to be arraigning one person after another on capital charges. It is not only
fraught with danger to the prosecutor himself, but is damaging to his reputation, to allow
himself to be called a prosecutor (Cic. Off. 2.14).
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Strunk argues that the Romans considered prosecution to be morally questionable at best because
prosecutors had to justify the reason(s) that the accused ought to be prosecuted. This tension
surrounding prosecution became closely tied with the act of delatio33.34
Prosecution could be detrimental to political and social reputations, if taken up willingly,
which the delatores often did. For example, Tacitus described that a delator, Aquilius Regulus,
“had made himself most bitterly hated for causing the downfall of the houses of the Crassi and of
Orfitus: he seemed voluntarily to have taken the accusation on himself though quite a youth, not
to ward off danger from himself, but because he hoped thereby to gain power” (Tac. Hist. 4.42).
Regulus’ acceptance of the prosecution did not align with republican legal norms of defending
against prosecution as the more honorable legal practice. Pliny also commented on Regulus’
dishonorable enthusiasm in prosecuting other citizens:
He [Regulus] had helped with the prosecution of Arulenus Rusticus [, a praetor in the
early 70s C.E., who was executed for writing a panegyric35 to the executed Thrasea
Paetus] and proclaimed his delight in Rusticus’s death by giving a public reading of his
speech against him…,where he used the words ‘Stoics’ ape’ ‘branded with [emperor]
Vitellius’s mark’ (Plin. Ep. 1.5).
It is clear, moreover, that Regulus and the delatores cared little for those norms and were only
concerned about political gain and the acquisition of wealth through legal prosecution.
In some more extreme cases, after a delatio had been performed and power had changed
hands between emperors, some individuals or families that had been prosecuted would seek
revenge on a delator that had fallen out of imperial favor. Tacitus explained how the enemies of
a delator, Sillius Rufus, had returned after the coronation of a new emperor to wreak their
revenge upon him:
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Neither with [Rufus’] fate in the balance nor with his condemnation recorded did his
spirit break, and it was asserted later that a life of luxury and abundance had made his
seclusion not intolerable. When his son Nerullinus was attacked by the accusers [those
having been afflicted by Rufus’ prosecutions], who relied on his father’s unpopularity
and on charges of extortion, the emperor interposed his veto, on the ground that
vengeance was satisfied (Tac. Ann. 13.43).
The delationes in many ways were detrimental to the delatores that had performed them
regularly. In this case, Rufus, not only suffered from his enemies that he created, but also his son
suffered.
While republican and imperials lawyers aspired to high philosophical ideals and truths,
the delatores cared little for ideals and, instead, focused on vicious prosecutions for wealth and
power. George L. Canfield explains that, under the Republic, “the Roman lawyer had high
ideals, he could illuminate his statues with verses from Homer and Aristophanes and dream of
absolute justice and laws automatically executory; but he also realized that he had to try his cases
in a degenerate world.”36 The republican lawyer pursued true justice, and although he realized
true justice is theoretical and not possible, he continued to pursue those high ideals anyway,
aiming to preserve justice in the practice of the law.
Unlike republican lawyers, the delatores did not pursue those ideals of true justice and
instead oriented themselves around monetary rewards. Many of the delatores, determined to gain
as much notoriety and wealth as quickly as possible, abandoned republican legal ideals, such as
the pursuit of the truth or making conclusions based upon the evidence presented. Pliny, in a
conversation with Regulus about oratory within the imperial courtroom, said to him: “Personally
I do try to copy Cicero,…and am not satisfied with the oratory of today. It seems to me foolish
not to model oneself on the highest standards” (Plin. Ep. 1.5). While Regulus seemed content
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using his new imperial style of prosecution, Pliny viewed him as foolish to reject republican
oratory and one of its most achieved teachers, Cicero, as a model.
These imperial prosecutions by the delatores reflected an overall departure from the
republican ideals of how lawyers ought to argue cases, as laid out by Quintilian, writing during
the Principate and drawing upon republican legal parameters. Quintilian in the first book of his
Institutio described his ideal orator, who incorporated republican ideals into an imperial system,
stating that “[t]he man who can really play his part as a citizen, who is fit for the management of
public and private business, and who can guide cities by his counsel, give them a firm basis by
his laws, and put them right by his judgements, is surely no other than our orator” (Quint. Inst.
1.10-11). Quintilian’s orator, much like Cicero’s ideal orator, who focused on pursuit of the truth
and impeachable moral character, needed to be more than an eloquent speaker; this orator needed
to be active in both the public and private realms. Quintilian also believed that a good orator not
only needed to be able to provide legal counsel for individuals and cities, but also legal
arguments for the justification of this counsel.
Orators must, in addition to all these qualities, have a secure sense of morality and
perceptibility, but, at the same time, be able to adapt to the changing situations of the courtroom
while delivering an excellent and masterful speech. The definition of an ideal orator did not
change even with the advent of the Principate, but rather, a group, the delatores, elected to ignore
oratory. Quintilian explained that a lawyer ought to have the ability to improvise on the spot,
which Quintilian defined as “[t]he greatest fruit of our studies, the richest harvest of our long
labours is the power of improvisation. A man who does not succeed in this should, in my
opinion, give up public work, and use his one talent, which is for writing, for other purposes
instead (Quint. Inst. 10.7). Holcomb explains that Quintilian’s orator sought to find a balance
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between not comprising his moral character and performing extemporaneous arguments in
arguments when necessary, both of which defined mastery in oratorical arts.37 These many
qualities all pertain to both the ideal republican and the ideal imperial lawyer. Imperial lawyers,
had to deal with the delatores and their prosecutions that, as Quintilian attested to earlier,
rejected and subverted the republican law continually. Michael Winterbottom explains that the
delatores relied on their ingenium38 and talked arrogantly about their “inspirations” that came to
them without having to review depositions or evidence in cases.39 Being an imperial lawyer
would have had to been extremely difficult job to perform. One would need to argue their cases
against a legal system that continually robbed its citizens of libertas, used its magistrates to
cement imperial interpretations of the law, and had individuals actively seeking out prosecution
cases against those who dissented with imperial policies.
The subversion of the traditional Roman law practices angered many Romans,
particularly politicians and writers, who painted the delatores as manipulative, vindictive, and
vicious. The earlier quotes used in this thesis from Quintilian’s Instituto and Tacitus’ works, the
Historiae and the Annales, all described the delatores in a negative light focusing on their
prosecutions that ignored republican traditions and ideals for power and money.
Often, the delatores would bring charges that were next to impossible to defend against.
For example, the charges could consist of hearsay evidence against the emperor that would be
determined by a character analysis, in which the delatores would slander the accused. Caepio
Crispinus, in Tacitus’ Annales, “alleged that Marcellus had retailed sinister anecdotes about
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[emperor] Tiberius: a damning indictment, when the accuser selected the foulest qualities of the
imperial character and attributed their mention to the accused” (Tac. Ann. 1.74). As in this
example, a delator could accuse a politician of being or doing everything that the emperor
despised and prohibited, which, of course, would be a charge that would be impossible to defend
against because the charge is entirely hearsay. The resulting action could include political
blacklisting, which effectively terminated a political career of an individual. Evidence, in the
modern sense, would not be required, rather the delator had to prove during the trial that the
accused’s character matched someone who would have committed the accused’s crime.
In other words, if the delator argued that the accused seemed like the type of man to
speak out against the emperor, and if a rumor was circulating that he was treasonous, all the
delator had to do was show that the convicted would be treasonous, if given the chance. All that
was required, moreover, in imperial courts to convict the defendant would be a rumor that the
defendant committed the accused crime, whether he did it or not mattered little. If the trial had
determined that the defendant’s character matched someone who seemed like the type of
character to commit the accused, then, alongside the rumor, that would be sufficient evidence to
convict the defendant.
Another example of the delatores’ perceived vindictiveness and active opposition to
traditional Roman values is afforded by Tacitus. In his Annales, he provided an account of
Granius Marcellus, who had been accused of treason by his own quaestor, as evidence of the
ruthless and power-driven goals of the delatores. Tacitus recalled that:
Before long, Granius Marcellus, praetor of Bithynia, found himself accused of treason by
his own quaestor, Caepio Crispinus, with Hispo Romanus to back the charge. Caepio was
the pioneer in a walk of life which the miseries of the age and the effronteries of men
soon rendered popular (Tac. Ann. 1.74).
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Rutledge, based upon this description in particular, described the archetype delator as an
adaptable, ruthless, and fierce careerist. The delator did not care about those whom he stepped
on while climbing to the apex of Roman political society. The Romans concluded that, on
account of the abuses of the legal system by the delatores and the political privileges that the
imperial system had given to them, a delator held a negative connotation with no concern for
republican idealism and society.40
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IV. The Institution of the New Imperial Legal System
Although, under the Republic, political competition was fierce, the delatores became a
new genus, one prone to political violence. The delatores became their own genus of Roman
citizen that not only had been excluded from the aristocracy, but, because of this exclusion, had
become violent and power-hungry.41 The imperial regime allowed for novi viri to rise up through
the political ladder and it, invariably, carried with it vicious, angry, and violent individuals, who
now having received power were determined to either involve themselves within the
aristocracy’s financial and social circles or exact revenge on the Roman aristocracy. Either way,
the delatores shattered the system of republican power and consumed the void of power that was
left after the politicians were either disgraced, exiled, or killed. For example, in the
aforementioned case of treason against Marcellus, Tacitus described that emperor Tiberius
intervened into the situation and acquitted Marcellus (Tac. Ann. 1.74). Tiberius, afterwards,
dispensed gifts, such as money, to senators involved with this case and similar cases that
followed, to appease all sides. Tacitus concluded that “while equity gained, liberty suffered”
(Tac. Ann. 1.75) because Tiberius had to flex imperial power in order to appease all sides of the
conflict subverting the Roman courts and taking this “justice” into his own hands.
The locus of legal power in the Republic, through individual merit of the ideal
orator/lawyer, had dramatically changed because the new locus of power under the Principate
was one man, the emperor. With Senatorial power continually fracturing, emperors, like
Tiberius, aided by their delatores, dismantled republican ideals and norms in order to cement
imperial power over Rome. The aftermath of the aforementioned case of Marcellus caused
turbulence in the Roman courts as senators clawed for power and money. This pursuit for power
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and money forced Tiberius to assert more power over the courts, severely limiting the courts’
independence. In other cases, the emperor would refuse to intervene, which was a form of
political statement in its own regard. For example, Tacitus again described how Tiberius’ silence
spoke volumes when recalling the events of a small riot that had killed and wounded centurions
and citizens alike:
The riot was discussed in the senate, and proposals were mooted [raised] that the praetors
should be empowered to use the lash on actors. Haterius Agrippa, a tribune of the people,
interposed his veto, and was attacked in a speech by Asinius Gallus, Tiberius said
nothing: these were the phantoms of liberty which he permitted to the senate (Tac. Ann.
1.77).
In this example, Tiberius’ actions, and inactions, disrupted traditional Roman forms of
developing and executing the law. Taking into account that the emperors progressively acquired
greater control of the Senate and the courts, the way in which the emperors controlled the
criminal justice system became a vital part in their subjugation of the Roman courts and Senate.
The Roman criminal justice system under the Principate became more private and the
imperial officials changed the way in which defendants were evaluated under the law. In
republican court, criminal defendants were allowed to argue their case in courtrooms where the
magistrate, the prosecutor, and a small audience would be present to deliberate about the case.
Under the Principate, however, criminal cases were more private events where an imperialbacked magistrate or the emperor himself would determine the outcome, based progressively less
and less on the evidence, but rather on their perceived understanding of the character of the
accused.
The way in which judgments were rendered about the accused’s character had changed
drastically, unlike in the republican system, the legal system in the Principate did not require
well-structured arguments, references to evidence, or preparation. The imperial legal system

32
encouraged the delatores to become lax in the formulation of their arguments and the imperial
courts rewarded their prosecutions that centered around acquiring as much money and power as
quickly as possible. The delatores improvised on the spot to make the accused seem like the
worst imperial stereotype without evidence, without finding the truth of the matter, or without
pursuing some ideal about truth or justice. The delatores had evolved into something completely
foreign and toxic to Roman conceptions of how individuals involved in the legal process ought
to act. In fact, the imperial criminal justice system justified the Roman state’s punishment of
criminals based upon their “ability” to evaluate the morality of the defendant through physical
signs. Putting it another way, imperial agents, or the delatores and magistrates, could determine
if a citizen is guilty of a crime not through evidence and testimony, but by the way that the
accused looked.42 Tacitus outlined an example of this major degression from evidence-based
trials in the accusation of Asiaticus, who was arrested and dragged into Rome by order of
emperor Claudius:
[H]e was heard inside a bedroom, with Messalina looking on and Suillius formulating the
charges: corruption of the military, who, he alleged, were bound in return for money—
and worse—to every form of infamy; adultery with Poppaea; and, finally, sexual
effeminacy (Tac. Ann. 11.2).
Asiaticus had been arrested and, then, convicted based upon hearsay of a conversation that the
accuser recalled, and the emperor found this testimony sufficient enough reason to arrest and
convict the defendant of the charges levied against him.
Just as Asiaticus was privately arrested and dragged into Rome to face indefensible
charges, Titius Sabinus (executed in 28 CE), a Roman knight, experienced a similar situation in
which he was tricked by the delatores to confess treason. Emperor Tiberius suspected that

42

Bryen 2014:249.

33
Sabinus led a conspiracy plot with Nero (37 C.E.-68 C.E.) and Agrippina (15 C.E.-59 C.E.)
against Tiberius but lacked sufficient evidence to prosecute them. Tacitus recounted how
Tiberius instructed the delator L. Aelius Sejanus, his close confidant to prosecute Sabinus:
Then, as Sabinus, with the usual weakness of the human heart in sorrow, broke into tears
coupled with complaints, he grew bolder and showered reproaches on Sejanus, his
cruelty, his arrogance, his ambition. Even [emperor] Tiberius was not spared, and these
conversations, regarded as an exchange of forbidden sentiments, gave the appearance of
intimate friendship (Tac. Ann. 4.68).
Unknown to Sabinus, however, Sejanus had carefully contrived a plan with Latiaris, the man
whom Sabinus had developed a close friendship, to induce Sabinus to speak negatively of
Tiberius. Sejanus placed three witnesses on top of Sabinus’ roof to overhear a part of the
conversation between Sabinus and Latiaris to use as “evidence” that he plotted against the
emperor. Therefore, Sabinus’ criticism of Tiberius had been recorded, privately and through
these three witnesses, and passed onto Tiberius himself. The Roman Senate convicted Sabinus of
treason in a plot against the emperor based off of one conversation and he was executed. Tiberius
later thanked the senate for disposing this ‘enemy of the state’ and hinted other conspirators,
which, Tacitus most likely intended to be Nero and Agrippina.43
In imperial court cases, defendants and the accused had to select their words carefully
because the delatores, such as Marcus Aper, had accepted the new imperial legal system and
supported it within court cases. Lawyers that did not adhere or accept the new system (unlike the
delatores) did not have the same liberties as the delatores, because they could not appeal to the
imperial throne as a justification for their arguments. Rather, lawyers were forced to continually
adapt to the new and changing legal system in order to strive to best accommodate the imperial
influence in the courts alongside their pursuits of truth and justice. For example, in Tacitus’
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Dialogus, Aper said that “[w]here change occurs, we are not immediately to conclude that is a
change for the worse: you must blame it on the carping spirit of mankind that whereas what is
old is always held in high esteem, anything modern gets the cold shoulder” (Tac. Dial. 18).
Strunk argues that Roman readers would have realized that the way in which Aper acts within
the courtroom meant that he supported the imperial regime, its belief that the Principate and the
Republic were the same system, and that the defendant Maternus ought to be careful when
making arguments.44 Aper appeared to believe in the contemporary imperial narrative that the
Roman Republic had never changed and the emperors had smoothly transferred power from the
Republic. Strunk explains that Aper accepted the Augustan propaganda that the Republic and the
Principate were the same system, a theory that argued that Augustus had restored and preserved
the Republic following the civil wars.45 There appears to be some serious contradictions in
Aper’s belief that the Principate was a natural extension of the Republic that did not rely on
political violence, an authoritarian figure, or the abolishment of libertas. Considering that
emperors and the delatores caused individuals to be exiled or executed, Aper’s belief that the
Republic has not changed lacked sufficient evidence as the delatores pursued prosecutions to
feed their power and influence within Rome.
The abolishment of democratic processes in favor of authoritarian imperial processes had
severely restricted the individual’s freedom and legal powers. Tacitus, in the Annales, explained
that “to consolidate his power, Augustus raised Claudius Marcellus, his sister’s son and a mere
stripling, to the pontificate and curule aedileship” (Tac. Ann. 1.3). Augustus and the subsequent
emperors appointed imperial allies or family members to important political and judicial
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positions that would ensure those imperial-favored positions would enact imperial policies.
Subtle appointments, such as this one, undermined the democratic processes of the Republic and
damaged personal libertas. The way in which the emperors superseded traditional forms of
climbing the political ladder, through the cursus honorum, restricted the abilities of individuals
to gain political prominence without relying on imperial favor. While some individuals were
certainly capable of rising to the top without imperial help, the delatores were able to rise much
faster using imperial favoritism as leverage over their rivals. In addition, the way in which trials
operated under the Principate denied the defendant the ability to argue compelling evidence in
their defense, when the entire way in which character analysis were performed had changed with
the Principate. The most obvious damage to libertas would be the emperor vetoing or greatly
influencing senatorial procedures, such as when Tiberius flexed imperial power to bail out a
delator.
The emperors, beginning with Augustus, threatened the individual’s sense of libertas and
superimposed themselves as domini. Strunk explains how Tacitus went as far as to describe
“Augustus as searching for bulwark (subsidia) for his dominatio, suggesting that Augustus’
fellow citizens were in the position of servi and Augustus as their dominus.”46 The servusdominus relationship would be one that all Romans would understand because of the Roman
slavery system. The connotation behind dominus is charged with the idea of a Roman citizen
being a slave to another Roman citizen, an unacceptable condition for a Roman, at least under
traditional republican norms.
Despite Augustus’ acceptance of the title of the pater patriae, the father of the fatherland,
an argument could be made that he and the subsequent emperors disliked having such titles
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because of the implied connotation as the emperors being domini. Emperors disliked having any
reference to slavery associated with them because Romans prided themselves on being free,
another conception of their libertas, because, as Tacitus explained, Romans understood libertas
as the freedom from domination (dominatio) and the ability to freely participate in public life.47
Suetonius echoed Tacitus in arguing that people perceived Augustus, Domitian, and the other
emperors as domini; this implied a loss of libertas having been regulated to servi under the
dominus. Suetonius, in the Lives of the Caesars, explained that Augustus did not enjoy being
called a dominus:
[Augustus] always shrank from the title of Lord [Master (Dominus)] as reproachful and
insulting. When the words, ‘O just and gracious Lord!’ were uttered in a farce at which
he was a spectator and all the people sprang to their feet and applauded as if they were
said of him, he at once checked their unseemly flattery by look and gesture, and on the
following day sharply reproved them in an edict (Suet. Aug. 53).
The emperor’s perception as dominus, described as such by Tacitus, aligned with the loss of
libertas, in which individual freedom had been replaced by imperial favor, established by the
Principate’s legal system, magistrates, and the delatores.
The use of violence in the Principate did not aim to control criminal offenses, but rather
aimed to maintain political power through political violence and, by extension, fear. Neither
criminal reform nor deterrence, for that matter, seemed to be what had been crucial for the
imperial legal system, rather the law focused on preservation of itself that had its foundations,
not in truths or justice, but on violence and fear.48 Violence and fear aimed, thus, in controlling
the population and public as well as private demonstrations of imperial power, which could be
expressed via the magistrates, executions, and the delatores.
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The act of being accused, the delatio, by the delatores fractured Roman society between
the accusers and the accused, as a result of the feuds that could arise from the delatio, regardless
of if the accused is indicted or not. One delator, Epirus Marcellus, created a bitter feud between
himself and another Roman family because of Marcellus’ close relationships with emperors
Vespasian and Galba, during the Year of the Four Emperors.49 Tacitus explained that Marcellus
and Vibius Crispus, another delator, had experienced one of these feuds.
[Marcellus and Crispus took] the leading place in the [e]mperor’s [mostly likely
Vespasian, but probably could include the other three emperors since the two delatores
had been in power for years] circle of friends and get their own way in everything….
[F]or our aged and venerable [e]mperor, who never shuts his eyes to facts, is well aware
that all the rest of his favorites owe their position to the advantages they have received
from him (Tac. Dial. 8.3).
Marcellus’ and Crispus’ prosecution demonstrate that these prosecutions by the delatores could
spark bitter hatred between the delatores and those families whom they had convicted for
generations.
Tacitus recounted another one of these feuds between Marcellus, Thrasea Paetus, and
Paetus’ son-in-law, Helvidius Priscus. Marcellus successfully accused and executed Paetus,
while, at the same time, Paetus’ son-in-law Priscus had been sent into exile from Rome. Priscus
exacted revenge on Marcellus for the honor of his father-in-law:
Driven into exile by the ruin of his father-in-law, [Helvidius] returned under [emperor]
Galba and brought charges against Marcellus Epirus, who had informed against Thrasea.
This attempt to avenge him, at once notable and just, divided the senators: for if
Marcellus fell, it was the ruin of a host of the guilty (Tac. Hist. 4.6).
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The Year of the Four Emperors was a turbulent year in the Principate in which four emperors came to power in a
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Year of the Four Emperors, see Rutledge 2001:121-126.
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Rutledge explains that it must have been very difficult for any individual to undergo a delatio.
The delatio could spark hatred between two families that could span generations and emperors,
particularly, if the accused lost their status, property, honor, or a family member.50 In these two
cases, the same delator, Marcellus, abused his political power and status to rip away Paetus’
wealth from his family.
For example, Maturnus, in Tacitus’ Dialogus, suggested that neither oratory nor morality,
on account of imperial interference in the legal system, played a major role in the imperial legal
system because state-sanctioned violence, either through the emperor’s decrees or lack thereof,
had replaced the need for either orators or lawyers. Tacitus, in his Dialogus, when he was
reflecting on the change between the republican-era lawyers and orators compared with the
imperial delatores’ apparent rejection of these republican norms, said that:
[it] is not a professional philosopher that we are delineating, nor a hanger-on of the
Stoics, but the man who, while he ought to drink deeply at certain springs of knowledge,
should also wet his lips at them all. That is the reason why the orators of former days
made a point of acquiring knowledge of civil law, while they received a tincture also of
literature, music, and mathematics. In the case that comes one’s way, what is essential in
most instances, indeed almost invariably, is legal knowledge, but there are often others in
which you are expected to be well-versed also in the subjects just mentioned (Tac. Dial.
31).
The delatores, however, like Aper, were not well-versed in these subjects and in fact, they
behaved in a manner that neglected or ignored republican legal practices preferring their own
imperially-backed prosecutions. “Messalla’s role in the dialogue,” according to Strunk, “seems
to be to deliver the argument that oratory declined under the Principate because morality
declined, the primary explanation given by ancient commentators.”51 I agree that oratory and
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morality were closely entwined, as seen with the prosecutions by the delatores, in which they
progressively became more aggressive, violent, and, ultimately, deadly.
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V. Conclusion
In conclusion, the emperors weaponized the delatores’ aggressive use of force and
manipulation of the law in order to restrict personal libertas and institute a regime based upon
fear, violence, and tyranny. The aggressive prosecution of the delatores contradicted Roman
norms and ideals of lawyers and the legal system. Roman law and politics became entwined with
the delatores as the emperors slowly closed their grip on the Roman political and legal system,
the delatores becoming the emperors’ fingers gripping Rome by the throat.
Although the delatores continued to exist and operate well beyond the second century
C.E., I chose to end the thesis at this point of time because the first and second centuries C.E.
presented the greatest amount of political turmoil in Rome. This turmoil allowed for powerhungry individuals to reap the fruits of chaos to solidify political power in the Roman social and
political atmospheres. While the delatores operated as far forward as the Byzantine Empire, I
believe that the time period in which they played the most significant role was during the
transition from the Republic to the Principate. This shift had been driven by the ambitions of the
delatores and the backing of their emperors, who actively secured imperial political power by
silencing political opponents and dissidents.
Many Romans, like Pliny the Younger, Quintilian, Suetonius, and Tacitus, became
disgusted with the delatores and the obvious disrespect for the republican laws. Despite the
propaganda deployed by the emperors and the delatores, like Piso and Aper, I argue, as does the
four aforementioned authors, that the delatores used Roman law and imperial influence to
fundamentally transform Rome from a Republic to an Empire. The transformations that Rome
experienced, having been scarred by the civil wars of C. Julius Caesar, left power voids in
Roman politics that aspiring individuals attempted to fill. While Roman lawyers tried to preserve
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republican law, the emperors and the delatores prevailed by using force, violence, and
manipulation to secure Rome’s future as an Empire under one man, the Roman Emperor.
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